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I. INTRODUCTION 
Significant changes in the global economic balance of power 
have taken place during the last several years. Japan and the West-
ern European nations have made substantial progress in achieving 
technological equality with the United States, 1 and many develop-
ing countries have taken or are now taking steps to improve their 
bargaining position relative to the developed countries. 2 
In addition, the past few decades have produced an enormous 
growth in the amount of direct equity investment made by compa-
nies in countries other than their home country.3 In order to main-
tain control over their domestic economies, developing country gov-
ernments have come to rely on foreign investment laws, tariffs, quo-
tas, and other means of regulating foreign economic influence.4 
In 1970, the countries of the Andean Common Market (the 
Andean Pact or ANCOM), 5 adopted uniform foreign investment 
* A.B. University of California at Berkeley; J.D. candidate at Yale Law School; Office 
of the General Counsel, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 1975. 
1. For a discussion of the Japanese and European challenge to U.S. hegemony see Hymer 
& Rowthorn, Multinational Corporations and International Oligopoly: The Non-American 
Challenge, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 57 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970). 
2. The success of the OPEC cartel has given new impetus to the demands of primary 
product-producing developing countries for the establishment of collective and stable pricing 
arrangements. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974). 
3. The great majority of such investment has been undertaken by the so-called "multina-
tional," "transnational," or "international enterprises." The transnational enterprise, though 
difficult to define precisely, can be generally characterized as a parent corporation which 
maintains a substantial amount of equity interest and/or control over a "large cluster of 
corporations of various nationalities." See R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINA-
TIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 4-18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY]. 
As of 1967, U.S. parent corporations were estimated to be managing about $110 billion of 
overseas assets through their positions of control. Id. at 18. 
4. Foreign investment laws are now in force or under consideration in nearly every 
country in the world. For the investing conditions in a given country see INVESTING, LICENSING, 
AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD (updated monthly). 
5. The Andean Common Market is made up of six nations on the western side of Latin 
America: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The legal instrument of 
its establishment is the Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, commonly known as 
the Treaty of Cartegena, adopted in Colombia in 1969. For text of the Treaty in English see 
8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 910 (1969). For a description and discussion of the Treaty provisions, 
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regulations. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, as Decision 24 
of the Andean Commission6 is called, regulates both the treatment 
of foreign capital entering or within ANCOM, and related agree-
ments on the transfer of technology, patents, licenses, and royal-
ties.7 The member countries of ANCOM were required by Decision 
24 to implement this Code as domestic legislation following its 
adoption by the Andean Commission. 8 
The governments of the ANCOM members were motivated by 
both common and individual interests when they adopted the An-
dean Code. Among these were the desire to achieve a reduction in 
foreign economic influence, 9 and to be able to plan more efficiently 
a regional industrial structure. 10 This was to be done in a way which 
including a complete bibliography of articles concerning them see Riesenfeld, Legal Systems 
of Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J . COMP. L. 415, 436-43 (1974). The Andean Com-
mon Market is often referred to as a "subregional common market," since it exists within 
the larger framework of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), composed of eleven 
Latin American nations. LAFTA was established in 1969 by the Treaty of Montevideo. Treaty 
Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(Montevideo Treaty), Feb . 18, 1960, 30 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 4, at 32, U.N. Doc. E/3333, 
E/CN .12/AC.45/13/Rev.1 (1960); INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, 
INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA 207 (1968). As its 
name implies, the purpose of the organization is to establish a free trade zone among the 
member nations. For a discussion of LAFTA see Riesenfeld at 431-36. 
6. The Commission is the Supreme Organ of the Treaty of Cartegena and is instructed 
per Chapter I, section A, of the Treaty to "empress its will" in the form of "Decisions." The 
Andean Foreign Investment Code is one in a series of such Decisions relating to ANCOM. 
For the most recent text of Decision 24 (as amended by Decision 37 of June 24, 1971, and 
Decision 37-A of July 17, 1971), see 11 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126 (1972). 
7. Decision 24 was promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Articles 26 and 27 of 
the Treaty of Cartegena. Article 27 provides, inter alia, for "a common system for treatment 
of foreign capital and likewise, systems for trademarks, patents, licenses, and royalties." 8 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 910, 917 (1969). 
8. All Decisions of the Commission require subsequent internal ratification by the mem -
ber countries. The problems surrounding internal implementation. of the Code are discussed 
in Section III of the text. 
9. This desire is reflected in the Introduction of the Code which reads: 
Common standards must contemplate mechanisms and procedures which are 
sufficiently efficient to make possible a growing participation of national capital in 
existing or future foreign enterprises in the Member Countries, in such a way as to 
lead to the organization of mixed enterprises in which national capital has the major-
ity interest and in which national interests will have the capacity to participate in 
determining fashion in the basic decisions of such companies. 
11 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126-27 (1972). 
10. Among the goals of ANCOM is to rationally allocate industrial responsibility among 
the member countries through the "sectorial programs of industrial development" (SPID) 
called for in Chapter 4 of the Treaty of Cartegena. The first such program has now been 
established for the metalworking industry, and a similar program for the petrochemicals 
industry has just been completed. See Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's Program for 
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would give no individual member country a significant economic 
advantage over the others. 11 
Since the adoption of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 
there have been important changes in the political and economic 
situations of the member countries (for example, the quadrupling 
of oil prices which has made Venezuela a new economic power in the 
Western Hemisphere), and there have been several important devel-
opments in the Code's local implementation. This Article is de-
signed to apprise the practitioner concerned with Latin America of 
progress in the implementation of the Andean Code and related 
regulations in the six ANCOM countries, and to discuss implica-
tions for the investment lawyer. It examines the progress of the 
Andean Pact's efforts in the field of foreign investment regulation 
in terms of bargaining theories previously used solely by economists, 
political scientists, and military strategists, but which have recently 
begun to receive attention from international lawyers. 12 It is the 
premise of this Article that both international lawyers and govern-
ment officials should begin to see the forces which influence the 
foreign investment process in a general theoretical framework in 
order to fully understand and perhaps better control these forces. 
II. BARGAINING THEORY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PROCESS 
A. The Changing Economic Power Relationship 
1. As DEFINED BY ECONOMISTS 
Bargaining theory is an analytical framework developed to de-
scribe the process of continuous negotiation which characterizes the 
relationship between foreign direct investors and host governments 
in developing countries. The bargaining theory discussed by inter-
national economists such as Raymond Vernon13 and Charles Kindle-
Industrial Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integration with Due and Deliberate 
SPID, 7 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 29 (1975); Ancom Approves Petrochemical Program; Auto 
Allocations Set, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 17, 1975, at 297. 
11. The obvious intention of the drafters was to insure that no single member country 
would be tempted to offer investment terms more lenient than a certain minimum standard 
so that competition for foreign investment could not ensue. 
12. For a discussion of the possible use of bargaining theory to anticipate expropriation 
see generally Anaconda Company and Chile Copper Company-Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation: Arbitration of Dispute Involving U.S. Investment Guaranty Program, 14 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'Ls 1210 (1975). 
13. See generally VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 26-112; Vernon, Restrictive 
Business Practices: The Operations of Multinational United States enterprises in Developing 
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berger14 emphasizes the relative economic power at the disposal of 
participants. As the economic power relationship between a foreign 
direct investor and a host country government changes, the invest-
ment conditions which the investor must accept also change. This 
relative economic power, reflected in bargaining strength, depends 
on a variety of factors, which are discussed below. 
2. FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE BARGAINING POWER OF THE 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTOR 
a. Economic Resources 
The great majority of foreign direct investments in both devel-
oped and developing countries are undertaken by multinational or 
transnational enterprises (TNE's). There are four major economic 
resources which are generally attributed to TNE's. These resources 
are investment capital or access to capital, 15 technology, 16 manage-
rial expertise, 17 and international markets. 18 The relative economic 
Countries: their role in trade and development, U.N. Doc. TD/B/399 (1972) [hereinafter cited 
as Vernon, Restrictive Practices]. 
14. See generally c. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 1-45 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as KINDLEBERGER, BUSINESS]. 
15. In developing countries, private investment capital is a critical resource. TNE's can 
finance an investment project in developing countries either by using their own financial 
reserves or by borrowing from financial institutions. In terms of borrowing capability, the 
TNE has the advantage over the local entrepreneurs in developing countries of better credit 
standing based on the TNE's proven performance and substantial equity holdings. Public 
international lending institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, make 
loans almost exclusively for developmental projects such as water companies and other infras-
tructure industries, instead of to private industrial projects . 
16. Technological capabilities are perhaps the most important single asset of the TNE. 
The Andean Pact is focusing much of its attention on acquiring technological resources. U.S. 
based TNE's, and to a lesser extent those of Japan and Western Europe, lead the world in 
technological innovation. At the high end of the technology spectrum are the advanced 
computer and semi-conductor industries in which the U.S. position is very strong. Technology 
becomes more widely held when we proceed down the spectrum to the machine tool and soft-
drink industries, in which the requisite technology for establishing a plant may be obtained 
from a wide variety of sources. 
17. When the TNE establishes a subsidiary in a foreign country, it must also provide 
trained managers to oversee operations and to coordinate the activities of the subsidiary with 
the other international operations of the firm. The TNE has typically established a highly 
coordinated and effective system of internal management as the result of previous experience 
in other countries. As time passes, the subsidiary trains local personnel to take over the 
management function so that the firm can blend into the local environment. Thus the subsid-
iary provides the host country with a new pool of local managerial talent. See VERNON, 
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 171, 184. 
18. Access to international markets is extremely important both in the extractive and 
manufacturing industries. The giant extractive industry TNE's provide a vital link between 
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bargaining power which a foreign investor is able to marshal from 
these resources depends upon the degree of control which it is able 
to maintain over these resources and upon their importance to the 
host country. If the capital, technology, management, and market 
access required for an investment project are available from a wide 
variety of sources, then the host country can award an investment 
project to the investor who offers the most generous terms. On the 
other hand, if the required technology is scarce, or if the investment 
project requires a high initial infusion of capital-as in the extrac-
tive industries-then the foreign investor can demand more gener-
ous terms because the number of suppliers is limited. 
b. Motivation 
If there is a compelling reason behind the TNE's decision to 
invest in a particular country or region, then it will be more willing 
to accept the investment terms which are offered by the host coun-
try government. If the investor's motivation is weak, that is, if the 
investor is more or less indifferent as to whether the investment 
should be undertaken at all, then he can demand better terms for 
investing. 
The motivations behind the decision to invest in an extractive 
industry project may be comparatively simple. The TNE may want 
to assure a supply of a natural resource, for example petroleum, 
copper, or cobalt. The TNE may want both to obtain the supply at 
the cheapest price-that is, from the original source-and to deny 
to competitors any access to the source of supply. In addition, the 
resource may be available in only a limited number of geographical 
locations so that the investor does not have a variety of options from 
which to choose. 
In the manufacturing industries, the situation is far more com-
plex, and numerous theories have been developed to explain the 
motivations of foreign investors. Among the factors which are 
thought to give rise to a manufacturing investor's decision to go 
abroad are: (1) as the technology embodied in a product becomes 
widely held it is necessary to move production into a foreign market 
the extractive phase in the developing country and the processing and marketing phases in 
the developed countries. The expenses of acquiring the shipping capabilities to transport raw 
materials between countries and of building refineries and mills are enormous. In addition, a 
direct link between extraction and end user provides an assured market for the resource. 
Finally, in the manufacture of consumer and intermediate goods, the TNE provides an 
international system of distribution and marketing. This system is essential to the exporting 
producer. 
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to reduce costs and effectively compete in the foreign market; 19 (2) 
TNE's fear losing a foreign market to a competitor and follow their 
competition into a region in order to protect themselves; 20 (3) earn-
ings are higher in foreign markets than in domestic ones, for exam-
ple, in he United States; 21 (4) TNE's try to distribute the risk of loss 
either through business22 or currency23 fluctuations by investing in 
several regions; and (5) it is the nature of the capitalist economic 
system to impose itself on other systems or to risk eventual col-
lapse.24 
This suggests the number of motivation scenarios which have 
been developed. Foreign direct investors approach developing coun-
tries for a variety of reasons and the factors which motivate the TNE 
must be taken into account when analyzing relative bargaining 
power. For example, if a TNE is seeking to establish a plant because 
its competitors have already done so and it fears losing the foreign 
19. The product life cycle model, developed by Raymond Vernon of the Harvard Busi-
ness School is probably the most widely accepted explanation for the behavior of TNE's in 
expanding abroad. Briefly, this model suggests that: (1) technological innovation occurs in 
the developed countries wherein the firm which develops the technology maintains a tempo-
rary monopoly over production and distribution of the product which embodies it; (2) at this 
initial point, the company faces little or no competition and can afford to produce the product 
where it is developed, and export it to foreign markets; (3) as time passes, the technology 
disperses (it is copied) and many producers enter the market-price competition ensues; (4) 
because labor inputs are cheaper abroad and because transportation and tariff costs raise 
prices in the foreign market, the producer goes abroad to lower the production cost and selling 
price of the product both for local consumption and export; (5) finally, local competitors enter 
the market with competitive advantages and the foreign investor introduces a new product. 
See VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 65-106. 
20. The oligopolistic reaction model of foreign direct investment motivation stresses the 
defensive character of foreign investment and attempts to explain why TNE's follow each 
other into foreign markets in closely ordered groups. Essentially, firms are taking out a form 
of "risk insurance" against losing a market to their TNE competitors. For an elaborate 
empirical study which supports the oligopolistic reaction model see F. KNICKERBOCKER, OLIGO-
POLISTIC REACTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1973). 
21. TNE's have historically reported higher earnings from their overseas subsidiaries 
than from their domestic operations. In 1974, return on equity of 163 companies surveyed 
showed that on the average, U.S. firms obtained a domestic profitability of 11.9 percent 
(down from 12.4 percent in 1973), while foreign profitability stood at 17.2 percent (down from 
17.8 percent in 1973). See What Happened in 1974 to International Firms ' Profitability, 
BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 8, 1975, at 249-50. 
22. See B. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND ASIAN EXPORTS 25-31, 44-54 (1975). 
23. See Aliber, A Theory of Foreign Direct Investment, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORA-
TION: A SYMPOSIUM (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970). 
24. From Lenin onward, there have been those who suggest that TNE's are but the 
capitalists' way of implanting their economic system abroad and, more or less, condemning 
the poor of developing countries to lives of poverty . See V. LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST 
STAGE OF CAPITALISM: A POPULAR OUTLINE (1969); H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM: THE 
ECONOMICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1969); J. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974) . 
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market to its competitors, then its bargaining strength relative to 
the host country government will be weaker because it is not indif-
ferent to whether or not an agreement is reached. 
c. Recourse · to Law or Diplomatic Intervention 
The transnational enterprise is a private party25 bargaining 
with a sovereign, the host country government. The host country 
government, in its sovereign capacity, has the power to manipulate 
its domestic law and thus to change its legal relationship with the 
foreign investor. If the host government decides to change the terms 
of an investment agreement or to expropriate the property of a 
foreign investor, the foreign investor has four basic alternatives: (1) 
to challenge the action in local courts; (2) to rely on international 
law and to seek enforcement in arbitration, foreign or international 
courts; (3) to request diplomatic intervention by its home country 
government; or ( 4) to threaten to withdraw its investment. 
While the foreign investor may be able to obtain some help from 
any or all of these sources, he is nevertheless at a decided disadvan-
tage relative to the host country government. 
3. FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE BARGAINING POWER OF 
DEVELOPING HOST COUNTRIES 
a. Economic Resources 
The economic bargaining power of a developing host country 
depends on a variety of factors. Among these are: the value of a 
na.ural resource(s) which the TNE is seeking to exploit; 26 the geo-
graphical location of, and access to, the country and its re-
source(s);27 the availability of the resource(s) from other countries 
(and under what conditions); 28 the stage of the country's economic 
development, that is, the structure of its capital market29 and the 
25. This of course does not hold true for state-owned enterprises. 
26. Obviously, the sine qua non for bargaining with an extractive industry producer is 
the possession of a mineral resource. The more scarce and necessary the resource is in world 
markets, and the higher its selling price, the better is the bargaining position of the country. 
Thus, cartels attempt to create conditions of artificial scarcity. 
27. If a TNE faces high initial costs in developing a transportation infrastructure to 
reach remote areas, it is going to demand a return which justifies its initial costs . Likewise, 
countries which lack direct sea access present potentially high transportation costs. 
28. A host country can make demands only to the extent that potential investors cannot 
obtain the resources on better terms in other countries. Another function of the cartel is to 
stop competition among suppliers by establishing uniform terms of supply. 
29. A country with a well developed capital market can demand equity participation for 
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income level of its inhabitants;30 the size of its consumer market;31 
the condition of the country's labor market; 32 the investment terms 
being offered by other countries (with similar resources);33 and 
whether or not foreign investors have already established operations 
in its territory. 34 
As a general rule, the more valuable the resources of a host 
country and the greater the degree of monopoly control which the 
country maintains over them, the stronger the country's economic 
bargaining position relative to foreign direct investors. 
b. The Development Needs of the Developing Countries and the 
Value of Foreign Direct Investment: Motivation 
If the development planners of a country consider that foreign 
direct investment plays a positive role in the development process, 
then they will seek to attract investors by offering reasonable or 
generous investment terms. They will also be more likely to "play 
fairly" with investors in order to maintain an attractive image.35 On 
the other hand, if development planners take a negative view of 
foreign direct investment or are indifferent as to whether foreign 
investors come or go, then there is no need to maintain an attractive 
investment climate or to be cautious or reasonable in negotiations. 
In this respect, the bargaining position of the host country govern-
ment is strengthened if it takes a negative or indifferent view to-
wards foreign direct investment. 
There is nothing close to unanimity of opinion concerning the 
local investors or purchase turnkey factories, relying on foreign investors only for the supply 
of technology and planning expertise. 
30. The attractiveness of a consumer market depends on a number of factors such as 
population, income, electricity, and cement production, cars in use, etc. For a typical analysis 
of consumer market strength see BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Dec. 25, 1974, at 411. 
31. Id. 
32. The wage rates which must be paid to employees and the availability of skilled 
manpower which reduces training time and cost are important considerations for investors. 
It has been the author's experience that among the reasons which TNE's cite for not being 
more active in the developing African countries is the lack of skilled or semi-skilled labor. 
33. Again, in most cases countries can make demands up to the point where it becomes 
more economical for investors to move elsewhere. 
34. If a TNE's competitors have already established themselves in a market, the host 
government can use their presence as leverage vis-a-vis newcomers. See F. KNICKERBOCKER, 
supra note 20, at 197-98. 
35. A current example of a country which believes that foreign direct investment is 
important to its development aspirations is Egypt, which is trying to promote an investment 
"free zone" and to achieve some sort of stability vis-a-vis neighboring Israel. See 13 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'LS 1500 (1974). 
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value of foreign direct investment in the development process and 
the literature on the subject is extensive.36 The positive view of 
foreign direct investment and its impact on the development pro-
cess is that it develops the industrial or extractive capabilities of a 
country and provides export earnings and import substitution at the 
least relative economic cost to the host country. 37 The arguments 
against foreign direct investment are both economic38 and socio-
political, 39 and reflect the concern that nation-states and their citi-
zens might lose control over their own economies and destinies. 
c. Sovereign Authority 
The power of sovereign governments to enact or change legisla-
tion within their domestic territories gives the developing host coun-
try government a powerful bargaining advantage over private for-
eign direct investors. While international law may provide an inves-
tor with legal remedies in the event of an investment dispute, 40 these 
36. For additional data on the value of foreign direct investment see The Impact of 
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. 
E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESN6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impact Report]. 
37. See Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies, 84 YALE L.J. 969, 1006-
07 (1975). 
38. Some of the negative economic arguments are that TNE's: (1) tend to export more 
capital than they bring into a host country as new investment; (2) by acting as the supplier 
of technology tend to reduce domestic incentive towards pursuing indigenous research and 
development; (3) use foreign managers to run local firms, thereby discouraging the develop-
ment of local entrepreneurial talent; (4) pay higher wages than domestic enterprises and 
foster socio-economic stratification; and (5) have easier access to local credit and therefore 
deprive local investors of access to domestic savings. See Diaz-Alejandro, Direct Foreign 
Investment in Latin America, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 23, at 319. 
39. The negative view of foreign direct investment is not confined to any particular 
geographical area, range of the political spectrum, level of economic development, or class of 
society. One has only to look to the U.S. Congress for examples of xenophobic legislation to 
curtail such foreign investment. The Dent-Gaydos Bill, H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) 
introduced on June 25, 1973, "to amend the Securities and [sir] Exchange Act of 1934 to 
restrict persons who are not citizens of the United States from acquiring . . . more than 5 
percentum of the voting securities of any issue whose securities are registered under such act 
... . "See Note, The Rising Tide of Reserve Flow, 72 MICH. L . REV. 551, 553 (1974). Regard-
ing the fear of foreign economic domination outside the United States, for Latin America, 
see Di~z-Alejandro, supra note 38, at 329-32; for Europe, see J. SERVAN-SCHRIEBER, THE 
AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1968); for Canada, see Rotstein, Shedding Innocence and Dogma, 1973 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 12; see generally H. STEPHENSON, THE COMING CLASH: THE IMPACT 
OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON NATIONAL STATES (1973). 
40. See, e.g., Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Inter-
ests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 553, 556 (1961); Weigel & Weston, Valuation upon the 
Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensa-
tion Under Intenational Law, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 3 (R. Lillich ed. 1972); G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 
(1962). 
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principles are neither so universally recognized nor so capable of 
application and enforcement as to provide investors with effective 
means of challenging the decisions of host country governments. 41 
The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact 
of Multinational Corporations on the Development Process and on 
International Relations42 states, in fact, that "developing countries 
have, of course, the power through legislation, to modify the terms 
of agreements. " 43 
B. The Role of Strategy in the Bargaining Process 
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BARGAINING POWER AND STRATEGY 
Although the economic power relationship between a host coun-
try and a foreign investor may determine the terms of an investment 
agreement, and a change in this power relationship may result in 
the demand for a change in the terms of this agreement, there is 
often no one single set of terms which may be acceptable to both 
parties. Bargaining strategy, which is more widely discussed by pol-
itical44 and military45 scientists than by economists, is employed to 
achieve the most advantageous outcome within the range of mu-
tually acceptable outcomes. 
2. THE USE OF STRATEGY BY HOST GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN 
INVESTOR 
Both a developing host country government and a foreign direct 
investor may recognize that they are better off to reach some invest-
ment agreement than to reach none at all. 46 The strategy objective 
41. This is not to imply that foreign governments do not recognize the principle of 
compensation in the event of expropriation. While compensation is not always "prompt, 
adequate, and effective," it is generally paid in one form or another. However, in situations 
which fall short of expropriation, such as the requiring of local equity participation, the 
imposition of new taxes, changes in royalty arrangements, etc., foreign investors, because of 
the commitments which are already sunk into an investment, usually find themselves in a 
take it or leave it situation. 
42. See Impact Report, supra note 36, at 38. 
43. Id. The Report also suggests that provisions for review of various clauses of invest-
ment agreements "after suitable intervals" could be useful under the same circumstances. 
For the reaction of the U.S. Government to the Report see State Department, The Views of 
the United States Government Concerning the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons on 
"The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and International Relations" 
(1975). 
44. For a discussion of recent works on bargaining theory by political scientists see 
Zartman, The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When, 26 WORLD 
PoL. 385 (1974). 
45. See generally T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). 
46. To illustrate, when the developing country government believes that economic reali-
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for the foreign direct investor is to obtain the most attractive invest-
ment terms from the host government without demanding so much 
as to cause the investment to be disapproved or confiscated. The 
strategy objective for the host government is to obtain the largest 
possible share of the benefits of the investment without losing the 
investment and its benefits altogether. 
An example of a bargaining tactic is to establish commitment 
to a "principle." By publicly announcing adherence to such a princi-
ple, a government or investor places its credibility and reputation 
on the line in a bargaining situation.47 A government can announce 
that, from a given date forward, it will no. longer permit investors 
to maintain more than 49 percent ownership of an investment. With 
its credibility riding on the "principle oflocal majority ownership," 
the government enters negotiations in a position from which it can-
not back down without damaging its credibility. The government 
has publicly given up its option to make a concession and the inves-
tor is forced to adjust his bargaining strategy to the established set 
of rules. 48 
C. Conclusion 
Relationships between foreign direct investors and developing 
ties have changed so that it is no longer content with the terms which it originally agreed to 
with the foreign investor, it calls for renegotiation of the terms. If the host government 
demands too much, the foreign investor may decide that continuing its operation is no longer 
econo:m,ically justified and may abandon its investment. If the foreign investor is adamant 
in refusing to renegotiate, the host government may confiscate his investment. Assuming that 
the foreign investor is making a positive contribution to the host economy, and assuming that 
it is also making a profit, then both sides would be left in a worse position. 
On the other hand, somewhere between the points of abandonment and of confiscation 
is a point or points where both parties could be satisfied with new conditions. The host 
government could obtain for itself or its citizens an equity share in the investment and a larger 
share of the profits, and the foreign investor could still be making a great enough rate of return 
on investment to be satisfied. 
47. Secrecy vs. Publicity. A potent means of commitment, and sometimes the 
only means, is the pledge of one's reputation. If national representatives can arrange 
to be charged with appeasement for every small concession, they place concession 
visibly beyond their own reach . . . . Both the initial offer and the final outcome . . . 
have to be known; and if secrecy surrounds either point, or if the outcome is inher-
ently not observable, the device is unavailable. 
T. SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 29-30. 
48. [T]he power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make 
concessions and to meet demands . . . . The very notion that it may be a strategic 
advantage to relinquish certain options deliberately, or even to give up all control 
over one's future actions and make his responses automatic, seems to be a hard one 
to swallow. 
Id. at 19. 
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host country governments are not static. On the contrary, as the 
bargaining power of the host country government increases, the 
terms on which foreign direct investments are treated are also sub-
ject to change. 
This is not necessarily a passive process. Countries can, indi-
vidually or collectively, take action to increase their bargaining 
power relative to foreign direct investors; theoretically, foreign di-
rect investors can do the same. Next, we will examine the steps 
which the countries of the Andean Common Market have taken to 
increase their bargaining power relative to foreign direct investors, 
and will attempt to identify the effects and the problems which this 
action has created for both the ANCOM countries and foreign direct 
investors. 
III. THE ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE: 
ITS STRUCTURE AND EFFECT ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTORS 
The system of regional economic integration created by 
ANCOM both increases the attractiveness of the member countries 
to foreign direct investors49 and increases the bargaining power of 
the member countries relative to these investors.50 The enactment 
of the Andean Foreign Investment Code51 and its subsequent imple-
49. The increased attractiveness results mainly from the gradual reduction of intermar-
ket tariffs as provided for in Chapter V of the Treaty of Cartegena. The tariff reduction 
process is going along smoothly and the timetable provided for in the Treaty is expected to 
be met. See R. Fullmer, A New Look at the Andean Pact, Mar. 1975, at 3 (U.S. Embassy, 
Lima, Peru). Another feature of ANCOM is the program of sectorial allocation which gives 
to the various countries a monopoly in certain products. See note 10 supra. The common 
external tariff of ANCOM (Chapter VI Treaty of Cartegena) and the prospect of duty-free 
access to all the LAFI' A countries provides additional incentive to foreign investors. 
50. The combination of sovereign authority and economic resources represented in 
ANCOM gives the member states, as a unit, the power potentially to deny an investor access 
to a much larger market than existed previously. Countries generally use foreign investment 
regulation as a means of attracting foreign investors by offering more generous terms than 
their neighbors. The ANCOM countries have chosen to deny themselves, as a group, this 
ability to make concessions, and thus they have to some degree denied investors the ability 
to play one government off against another. 
51. A select bibliography of articles relating to the Code includes Furnish, The Andean 
Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investments, 5 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313 
(1972); Oliver, Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative 
Order, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972); Lisocki, The Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME 
LAWYER 317 (1973); Perenzin, Regulation of the Andean Foreign Investment Code: Colombia, 
4 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 15 (1972); Saavedia, Acuerdo de Cartegena: Inversion extranjeras, 
14 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRAc16N 261 (1973); Orrego Vicuna, La incorporacion del ordinamiento 
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mentation in the six member countries represents a new trend in the 
developing countries towards the treatment of transnational enter-
prises52 and, if successful, may become a model for future economic 
development worldwide.53 Cooperation, as the Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries has demonstrated, can bring about 
radical economic changes. 54 
While the Andean Code provides minim um standards for the 
treatment of foreign direct investors in each of the ANCOM mem-
bers,55 the process of domestic implementation56 and enforcement57 
has been uneven. This reflects the fact that the attitude towards 
foreign direct investment embodied in the Code is more consistent 
with the internal policies and economic needs of some of the mem-
ber countries-such as Venezuela and Peru-than it is with the 
policies and needs of others-such as Bolivia and Chile. Herein lies 
one of the major difficulties of both the AN COM compact and other 
cooperative international arrangements: 58 nations tend to identify 
juridico subregional al derecho interno, 11 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N 39 (1972). Also, there 
has been a proliferation of business-oriented publications concerning the Code. See, e.g., 
COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, ANDEAN PACT: DEFINITION, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS (1973). 
52. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
53. The Andean Code is cited with praise in the United Nations report Impact of Multin-
ational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, and several of its major 
provisions are suggested as means of changing the role of foreign investors in developing 
countries. See Impact Report, supra note 36, at 59-62. 
54. See Section 111.D. of the text. 
55. Article 33 of the Andean Code provides that: 
With respect to the matters covered by this regime, the rights established herein for 
foreign and mixed enterprises are the maximum which may be granted to them by 
the Member Countries. 
11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 137 (1972). 
56. In Bolivia the text of the Andean Code was established as a part of national law 
through Decree Law 9798, issued June 30, 1971. In Chile, the Andean Code was ratified by 
Decree Law 482 issued by S. Allende. Decree Law 746, reaffirming Chile's adherence to the 
Code following a major confrontation over it with other ANCOM members, was issued in 
November 1974. Although the Code was initially ratified in Colombia by Presidential Decree 
1299 and Regulation D2153 issued on July 3, 1971, this Decree was declared unconstitutional 
by the Colombian Supreme Court. After the Colombian Congress gave the President author-
ity to ratify the Code, it was implemented by Decree Law 1900 on September 15, 1973. 
Ecuador ratified the Code by Supreme Decree 974 on June 30, 1971. In Peru, the Andean Code 
was ratified by Decree Laws 18900 of June 30, 1971, and 18999 of October 18, 1971. Venezuela, 
which ratified its entry into ANCOM and its acceptance of the Andean Code in September 
of 1973, was accepted for ANCOM membership and had the Code effectively ratified on 
January 1, 1974. Implementation of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, State Department 
memorandum, ARA, June 11, 1975. 
57. See Section 111.B. of the text. 
58. The controversies in the European Economic Community regarding the flow of farm 
products is a good example of this. England, for example, has been reluctant to permit its 
agricultural sector to face competition from other EEC members and has often accused other 
members of "dumping" their surplus produce on English markets. 
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with and to pursue their individual interests more forcefully than 
they do their interests in international cooperation.59 
The provisions of the Andean Code can be roughly divided into 
three major categories: (1) those concerning equity ownership and 
control; (2) those regulating the business operations of firms; and 
(3) those relating to the transfer of technology. 
A. Provisions Relating to Equity Ownership and Control 
1. THE DIVESTMENT REQUIREMENT 
Foreign-owned and controlled enterprises, other than those 
which fall into either of two exempted categories, are required grad-
ually to divest themselves of majority ownership and control60 over 
a 15 or 20 year period following entry into ANCOM.61 Foreign-owned 
enterprises which were present in ANCOM countries before the en-
actment and implementation of the Code are required to declare 
their intention to divest within three years following the date of the 
Code's implementation, 62 if they want their products to enjoy duty-
59. This is for the most part due to the fact that governments are more accountable to 
their constituents than they are to the international communities. 
60. Foreign enterprises are required to transform into so-called "mixed-enterprises." 
Mixed enterprises are made up of between 51 and 80 percent local ownership and control over 
firm decision-making must be in the hands of local (or "national") investors. National au-
thorities must approve the control arrangements. Decision 47 of the Andean Commission 
provides that a "mixed enterprise" may also be one in which at least 30 percent ownership 
and effective control is in the hands of the State. See Decision 47, 10 DERECHO DE LA 
INTEGRACl6N 197 (1972). 
61. A transformation timetable is provided in Article 30. Article 31 contains certain 
provisions which must be stipulated in a transformation agreement. The typical transforma-
tion timetable requires that 15 percent of stock, assets, or rights must be placed on sale for 
national investors at the time of entry into ANCOM (except in Bolivia and Ecuador, where 
the Code provides that for an initial three-year period foreign investors may maintain 100 
percent ownership). Within one-third of the transformation period-15 years in Chile, Colom-
bia, Peru, and Venezuela-30 percent of ownership must be in local hands. Within two-thirds 
of the period, 45 percent must be so situated, and before the date of completion at least 51 
percent ownership and effective control must be maintained by national investors (for Bolivia 
and Ecuador the transformation timetables are somewhat different). Decision 24, 11 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 136-37 (1972). While the transformation agreement registered with the host 
government must contain a system which insures the sale of ownership rights to local inves-
tors, there are some difficulties inherent in this requirement. See text accompanying notes 
117-22 infra. 
62. The Code, as we have seen, was implemented at different times in the various 
member countries. Therefore, the three-year limit on declaring an intention to divest is 
different for the various countries. In addition, both Bolivia and Ecuador have declared that, 
because of their least developed status, their timetables will not be started earlier than the 
last of the other members. From a reading of Venezuela's implementing Decrees, it appears 
that this date would be January 1, 1977. 
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free status within the common market. Subsequent to the enact-
ment of the Code, the Andean Commission has ruled that compa-
nies existing in ANCOM prior to the Code may declare their inten-
tion to divest after the three-year deadline; but when this intention 
is declared, the company must meet the transformation percentages 
in force at that time. 63 
Foreign-owned companies are required to register the value of 
their investment with the office of the competent authority in the 
host country. 64 According to the Code, the value of an investment 
may include financial capital, plant, machinery, or equipment, 65 
but it may not include intangible or technological contributions 
such as patents, licenses, or trademarks. 66 The valuation which is 
agreed upon with the competent authority is of great importance to 
the investor, not only in determining the amount for which the 
enterprise can be sold to local investors, 67 but in calculating, as well, 
the amount of profits which can be annually remitted abroad or 
reinvested. 68 Because the authorities of the individual member 
countries are responsible for concluding the valuation agreement 
with the individual investor, the negotiations for an agreed valua-
tion provide a degree of flexibility which the parties can use to 
reconcile their interests. 
2. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE DIVESTMENT REQUIREMENT 
There are two major categories of enterprises which are exempt 
from the divestment requirement described above. The first con-
cerns foreign enterprises in the extractive industries, or the so-called 
"basic products" sector.69 The individual member countries are per-
mitted to regulate firms in the basic products sector in any way they 
63. See Ancom Balks at Sectorial Plans but Rules on Fadeout, Patents, BUSINESS LATIN 
AMERICA, June 12, 1974, at 186. 
64. Decision 24, art. 5, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 130 (1972). 
65. Decision 24, art. 1, id. at 128. 
66. Decision 24, art. 21, id. at 134. Intangible technological contributions, although not 
defined in the body of the Code, are referred to in Annex 1. In addition, implementing 
legislation such as that of Venezuela makes it clear that patents, trademarks, technical 
services contracts, and the like cannot be included in the valuation. See Decree 63, art. 59, 
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220, 1231 (1974). 
67. See text accompanying notes 117-22 infra. 
68. See Section III.B. of the text. 
69. The basic products sector is defined to include "primary activities of exploration and 
exploitation of minerals of any kind, including liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, gas 
pipelines, oil pipelines, and exploitation of forests." Decision 24, art. 40, 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'Ls 126, 135 (1972). 
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see fit. 70 While this exemption reflects the fact that uniform regula-
tion of the extractive industries might present difficult problems for 
ANCOM because of the uneven distribution of mineral resources 
and unequal development of the extractive industries sectors, 71 ex-
emption from ANCOM regulation cannot be interpreted as a boon 
for investors.72 Recent events in Venezuela provide witness to this 
fact. 73 
There are other groups of activities for which the Andean Code 
provides special treatment, but the individual member govern-
ments may provide exemption from this treatment, and control 
TNE's by national regulations that they consider appropriate.74 The 
Code provides that no new foreign direct investments may be made 
in the "public services" sector,75 in insurance, commercial banking, 
and other financial institutions, 76 or in domestic transportation, 
advertising, radio, newspapers, magazines, or other enterprises re-
lated to domestic marketing. 77 In the public services sector, existing 
firms may continue to operate and may make new investments 
which are necessary for efficient operation. Foreign banks78 may 
continue to operate, but they must cease receiving local deposits 
within three years of the Code's entry into force unless they agree 
to convert into "national" enterprises. The enterprises in the do-
mestic marketing activities mentioned must convert into national 
enterprises within three years. 
70. Decision 24, art. 44, id. at 140. The exemption for the basic products sector includes 
an exemption from the profit remittance ceiling. 
71. For example, in regards to the unequal distribution of resources, Chile, as one of the 
world's leading exporters of copper, would be extremely reluctant to have this sector of its 
economy governed by ANCOM regulations. In regard to unequal development, while 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru all have substantial petroleum deposits, their petroleum in-
dustries are at very different stages of development. Therefore, different standards of treat-
ment must be accorded to investors in order to allow the lesser developed to encourage 
investment, while the more developed, for example, Venezuela, can nationalize. 
72. Peru, for example, has announced its intention to eventually nationalize its 
extractive industries. See generally Plan Inca, PERUVIAN TIMES, July 1974. For a Spanish text 
of Plan Inca see Expreso (Lima), July 29, 1974 (Special Supplement). 
73. The Venezuelan Congress passed the petroleum nationalization bill in August 1975. 
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1975, at 45, col. 2. 
74. Decision 24, art. 44, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 140 (1972). 
75. Public services are defined as "drinking water, sewage, electric power, illumination, 
garbage collection, and sanitary, telephone, mail and telecommunications services." Decision 
24, art. 41, id. at 139. 
76. Decision 24, art. 42, id. at 139. 
77. Decision 24, art. 43, id. at 139. 
78. No mention is made in the Code as to what regulations the insurance industry or 
"other financial institutions" are subject to, other than that no new investments may be made 
in them. Decision 24, art. 42, id. at 139. 
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The member countries may, however, choose to apply different 
standards of regulation for any or all of the above mentioned activi-
ties, and several have done so. 79 Some of the member countries have 
added additional sectors to those which are reserved for "national" 
enterprises. 80 
Finally, enterprises which export at least 80 percent of their 
production to non-ANCOM markets are exempted from all divest-
ment requirement. Those products which remain in ANCOM will 
not, however, enjoy duty-free status.81 
B. Questions Regarding the Divestment Requirement 
There are several significant questions regarding the divest-
ment requirement of the Andean Code which present themselves to 
the foreign investor. The first is the question of whether the Code 
provisions requiring divestment of majority equity ownership and 
control are being strictly enforced by the ANCOM countries, or 
whether the Code has merely established a set of "rules of the game" 
which may be broken when the circumstances call for it. 
1. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OR "RULES OF THE GAME?" 
Although empirical data on the performance of individual firms 
79. In Bolivia, Supreme Decree 11450, June 1974, exempts banking and financial institu-
tions from the Code's provisions. See State Department memorandum, supra note 56, at 1. 
In Chile, Decree Law 748, Nov. 7, 1974, exempts development banks, and Decree Law 818, 
December 27, 1974, exempts commercial banks from the Code. Id. at 2. In Colombia, Decree 
No. 2719 of December 28, 1973, exempts banks, commercial financial institutions, and com-
panies engaged in domestic marketing from the Code. Decree 295 of February 24, 1975, 
provides that foreign banks and credit institutions must transform into mixed companies 
under the supervision of a new Commission. Decree 169 of January 31, 1975, regulates compa-
nies involved in domestic marketing activities. See Airgram No. A-66 from the U.S. Embassy 
in Bogota, Colombia, to the Department of State, Apr. 2, 1974. In Ecuador, Supreme Decree 
1029 of July 31, 1971, exempted all specially treated sectors from the Code. Resolutions 01 to 
105 issued in January 1975 substituted internal regulations for most of these sectors and 
added others. See note 80 infra. Peru has not invoked the escape clause. Venezuela has chosen 
not to invoke the escape clause in most instances but has indicated that special regulations 
will be issued for banks and other financial institutions. Decree 62, art. 4, 13 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'Ls 1220, 1221 (1974). Venezuela has, like Peru, added additional sectors to the "national" 
category. See note 80 infra. 
80. Pursuant to Decision 24, art. 38, Ecuador has ruled that construction firms must 
transform into national enterprises. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 138 (1972). Venezuela has 
added "professional services" to the national enterprise category. The professional services 
sectors, vaguely defined, is regulated by domestic law and reserved to national enterprises. 
Decree 62, art. 1, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1220 (1974). 
81. Decision 24, art. 34, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 137 (1972). 
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in ANCOM is scarce, 82 it seems clear that both the member country 
governments and foreign direct investors are taking the divestment 
requirement seriously. Several qualifications regarding this conclu-
sion must be made. First, the initial date for the divestment deci-
sion of existing companies has not yet been reached in most of the 
member countries. 83 Therefore, whether or not firms would have 
been forced to divest at this date in order to enjoy ANCOM duty-
free status can only be verified by the example of Peru and the 
pronouncements of the other host country governments. However, 
the ANCOM countries have tempered their original all-or-nothing 
position84 by providing that firms may bypass the initial date if it 
is not essential that their products enjoy duty-free status, and that 
they may decide at a future date on divestment. 85 
The data from Peru indicate that the Peruvian government has 
strictly enforced the initial divestment deadline, 86 going even be-
yond the rules as now provided by the Andean Code. Peru required 
that manufacturing firms meet the initial divestment deadline in 
order to enjoy ANCOM tariff concessions, and enacted a General 
82. The most thorough and reliable source on individual firm behavior which is publicly 
available is a weekly publication Business Latin America published by Business International 
Corp. This reference is used not only by businessmen, but by government officials in the 
United States and Latin America. While the author worked in the General Counsel's Office 
of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and had access to material relating to the 
application of the Code vis-a-vis U.S. firms, this information is not available for publication. 
Nothing in this Article in any way reflects the opinions of the U.S. Government or OPIC. 
83. Colombia did not implement the Code until September 15, 1973, and Venezuela not 
until January 1, 1974. Therefore, for Colombia the initial divestment decision need not be 
made until September 15, 1976, and for Peru, January 1, 1977. See note 58 supra. In Peru, 
the initial date was reached and the divestment requirement was enforced. See note 85 infra. 
Chile has had a great deal of internal debate over when and how the Code was implemented, 
and though technically, the initial date for enforcement has passed, there is no evidence of 
firms divesting (although most were expropriated during the Allende administration). 
84. Originally, Article 28 of the Code provided that existing firms had to decide within 
three years of the date of the Code's entry into force as to whether they intended to divest 
and take advantage of the duty-free market. See note 61 supra. 
85. This change was made by a ruling of the Andean Commission, in June 1974, not by 
an amendment to the Code. The ruling provides that companies which have not provided 
divestment plans by the three-year deadline will lose ANCOM tariff concessions, but may 
subsequntly choose to divest and gain them. However the final deadline for divestment 
remains the same. See Ancom Balks at Sectorial Plans But Rules on Fadeout, Patents, 
BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, June 12, 1974, at 186. 
86. See Peruvian Firms Use Comunidad to Meet Fade-Out Requirements, BUSINESS 
LATIN AMERICA, June 5, 1974, at 183. This article resulted from a survey which Business Latin 
America conducted among companies located in Peru. The results are that the great majority 
of companies met the initial deadline requirement by selling 15 percent ownership to a worker 
comunidad. See note 87 infra. 
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Industries Law which requires that firms gradually sell 50 percent 
of their equity to a worker "communidad."87 Foreign firms were 
given little choice whether or not to accept the initial deadline, since 
failure to meet it would result both in permanent loss of ANCOM 
duty-free privileges and a divestment of ownership. Peru, however, 
must be regarded as a special case within ANCOM because of its 
radical economic policies.88 Existing manufacturing enterprises in 
other ANCOM countries have yet to be forced into divestment. 
The second observation which can be made from the available 
empirical data is that, almost without exception, new companies 
entering AN COM are entering as joint ventures from the outset, not 
only meeting with the Code's initial local participation requirement 
but in most cases surpassing it. 89 These companies are finding part-
ners either in the private sector or with local governments. 
A third observation-a judgment made from readings of official 
AN COM government pronouncements, 90 business world reaction, 91 
87. Peru's General Industries Law of 1970, Decree Law 18350, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1225 
(1970), provides that manufacturing companies must sell at least 50 percent of their equity 
ownership to a workers group called the comunidad. This is accomplished by providing the 
comunidad with 15 percent of the firm's pre-tax profits each year until the comunidad has 
purchased 50 percent of equity. 
88. For a statement of Peruvian economic ideology see Plan Inca, supra, note 72. 
89. The empirical data in this case come from a three-year survey the author made of 
articles in Business Latin America. Of 18 major new foreign direct investments reported for 
the AN COM countries between 1972 and mid-1975, 13 were begun as joint ventures with local 
participation above 30 percent. All five of the new investments beginning with 100 percent 
of capital were headed for Bolivia and Ecuador where firms need not have any local participa-
tion until five years after production begins (and then only five percent). The limitation on 
this data is, of course, that if companies are actually making secret deals with ANCOM 
governments, these deals are not likely to be reported in any publication. 
90. In Venezuela, President Perez's nationalist economic policies and the text of Decrees 
62 and 63 themselves make it clear that Venezuela intends to apply the divestment require-
ments rigorously. See Decision 24 in Venezuela: Harsher than Anticipated, BUSINESS LATIN 
AMERICA, May 29, 1974, at 175-76. 
In Peru, the statements of President Velasco and the requirement of compliance with the 
General Industries Law make divestment a certainty. Velasco's credibility rides on his treat-
ment of TNE's. For Colombia, the government may be slightly less enthusiastic about the 
divestment requirement than Peru or Venezuela, but it nevertheless has indicated that it fully 
intends to meet its international commitments. See An In-Depth Look At What Really Is 
Happening in Colombia, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, June 25, 1975, at 201-02. Ecuador surprised 
many foreign businessmen with its tough internal implementation of the Code. See Ecuador 
Puts New Slant on ANCOM Rules, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Apr. 23, 1975, at 136. With its 
new oil income, Ecuador can afford to be tough with investors. Chile and Bolivia are the two 
ANCOM countries which have vacillated most with respect to the Code: Chile attempting 
to ·change several Code rules with the passage of Decree 600 and declaring the Code unimple-
mented then later backing down on all of these points. See Andean Countries Challenge 
Chile's Investment Law, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 25, 1974, at 312; Ancom Solution to 
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and unclassified U.S. Government reports92-is that the ANCOM 
governments, most forcefully Peru and Venezuela, intend to apply 
the divestment requirement vigorously. As of yet, there is little rea-
son to doubt the good faith of these pronouncements. However, as 
the modification of the initial timetable deadline and the hedging 
by Bolivia and Chile93 have shown, the ANCOM Commission and 
some of the member countries are attempting to adapt to specific 
economic circumstances when necessary. 
2. CAPITAL MARKETS 
A second important question regarding the divestment require-
ment is whether sufficient local capital will be available to purchase 
majority equity ownership at fair prices. 
While the domestic capital markets of the ANCOM countries 
are not particularly well developed, it does not appear that capital 
for divestment will be lacking. In the first place, foreign companies 
will have between 15 and 20 years to complete the divestment pro-
cess, so that local capital may be generated slowly. Divestment 
would not require large lump-sum payments. Second, petroleum 
export revenues from Venezuela and Ecuador have substantially 
improved the capital base of these countries, and Venezuela is chan-
neling significant amounts of capital to regional lending institutions 
at commercial rates. 94 Third, Peru has created a unique profit shar-
ing plan which firms expect to provide the capital for divestment. 95 
Finally, international and regional lending institutions (for exam-
Investment Code Controversy Shows Strong Solidarity of Bloc, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Nov. 
27, 1974, at 384. Bolivia claims that firms which intend only to supply its market need not 
divest. See State Department memorandum, supra note 56, and BOLIVIA, LEY DE INVERSIONES 
68-76 (1972). 
91. In both Business Latin America and the Latin American Economic Report, business-
men reflect a resignation to the fact that the divestment requirement will, in fact, be enforced. 
92. U.S. Government Embassy unclassified reports consistently advise U.S. business-
men that they should expect to comply with the Code and the divestment requirement. See, 
e.g., Airgram No. A-221 from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, to the Department of 
State, Dec. 31, 1974, at 10, which states "Colombia will, of course, continue to apply the 
Andean Foreign Investment Code." See also Airgram A-36 from the U.S. Embassy in Quito, 
Ecuador, to the Secretary of State, Apr. 24, 1975, at 7; Airgram A-69 from the U.S. Embassy 
in Caracas, Venezuela, to the Department of State, Apr. 22, 1975, at 2. 
93. See note 90 supra. 
94. Venezuela has made $500 million available to other Latin American countries 
through the IDB which can be used for commercial purposes. See Inter-American 
Development Bank- Venzuelan Fondo de Inversiones: Trust Fund to Contribute to the 
Financing of Economic Projects, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 315 (1975). 
95. See note 87 supra. 
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ple, the Andean Development Corporation, created mainly to aid 
divestment) have taken an active interest in aiding the ANCOM 
countries in the divestment process. 96 
3. How THE DIVESTMENT REQUIREMENT SHOULD AFFECT INVESTOR 
DECISION-MAKING 
The major disadvantage of loss of equity ownership and even-
tual loss of managerial control over a foreign subsidiary operation 
is that the parent company and the new local owners may disagree 
over how the subsidiary should be operated. The relinquishment of 
control over corporate decision-making can present problems, such 
as whether profits should be distributed or retained and invested; 
to what markets products should be exported; and whether 
patents, trademarks, and the like should be sold to other firms. 
For the great majority of manufacturing firms these problems 
are probably not tremendously significant, since it can be generally 
assumed that local investors and foreign investors share the same 
desire to maximize the return on investment. The firms for which 
these problems may be more acute are those in high-technology 
industries where control over technological resources may be at a 
premium. The firms most resistant to the divestment program are 
those which are least interested in giving up control over new pro-
duction processes and products.97 
As a matter of policy, new foreign direct investments should 
probably be made as joint ventures with substantial local equity 
participation from the outset. By forming local partnerships with 
either private investors or governments, the foreign investor can 
avoid many of the bureaucratic entanglements involved in the grad-
ual divestment process. Thus, the investor would have less concern 
over whether local capital will be available when the time for divest-
ment comes, whether disagreements with local bureaucracies over 
share valuations will arise, whether confiscatory taxes will be levied, 
and related problems arising in dealings with any complex but not 
yet fully developed bureaucratic structure. By establishing a sub-
96. The divestment bank scheme, originally proposed by A. Hirschman, came to life in 
the form of the Andean Development Corporation which provides investment capital to 
Andean investors. See A. HIRSCHMAN, How TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA AND WHY (1968); 
Fresard Rios, El Tratado que creo la Corporaci6n Andena de Fomento, 3 DERECHO DE LA 
lNTEGRACION 28 (1968); Andean Loan Body Gets New Financial Muscle, BUSINESS LATIN 
AMERICA, Feb. 19, 1975, at 60. 
97. Vernon discusses the problems of the highly innovative firm regarding divestment 
programs in VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 265-70. 
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stantial local partnership, the foreign investor is likely to obtain 
more favored treatment from local government officials because the 
investment will be perceived as providing greater local benefits, and 
because major local investors are more likely to be on friendly terms 
with local government officials. 
Because divestment of managerial control can only take place 
at the end of a 15 or 20 year period, an optimal arrangement for the 
foreign investor is local equity participation, combined with mainte-
nance of managerial control until the last available date. In this 
manner, the foreign investor trades his technological resources and 
managerial expertise for the maximum period of decision-making 
authority. 
For investors with projects already operating within ANCOM, 
the decision of whether to divest and take advantage of the tariff 
elimination program, or to retain ownership and control and to sup-
ply primarily local markets, depends again on a careful cost-benefit 
analysis. Firms which are under-utilizing productive capabilities 
and whose products could easily be transported to other markets 
within ANCOM may gain from trading equity for an expanded 
market area. On the other hand, firms which are oriented primarily 
to local markets and whose productive capacities are geared only to 
meet these markets (which may prefer exporting to third country 
markets) would discover little incentive for transformation. 
As a general rule, the only firms which may be reluctant to 
accept the divestment requirement are those which place a pre-
mium on their technology, production processes, and trade names. 
However, for firms whose competitive advantages lie more in the 
areas of capital investment capabilities, managerial expertise, and 
marketing capabilities, the divestment program does not create a 
substantial disincentive to investment in ANCOM. 
C. Provisions of the Andean Code Affecting Operations 
The Andean Code prescribes a comprehensive set of provisions 
which regulate the operations of foreign-owned firms within 
ANCOM. These provisions include: (1) a ceiling on the amount of 
net profits which can be remitted abroad; (2) a limitation on the 
amount of net profits which can be reinvested in the enterprise; (3) 
regulations of the transfer of capital gains abroad; ( 4) regulation of 
the amount of interest which can be paid to amortize loans; (5) 
restrictions on access to local credit; (6) a system to oversee transfer 
pricing practices; (7) the assertion of domestic jurisdiction for the 
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settlement of investment disputes; (8) a series of regulations on 
agreements for the transfer of technology, patents, trademarks, li-
censes, and royalties. 
The Andean Code provides that foreign investors are limited to 
remitting net profits of up to 14 percent of the value of the registered 
investment annually. 98 The value of the investment is registered 
with the competent local authority when the firm enters the host 
country or, in the case of existing firms, as of a date set by local 
officials. The Andean Code provides general rules regarding valua-
tion. The value of the investment may include foreign capital, 
machinery, and equipment, 99 but it may not include intangibles 
such as patents or trademarks.100 However, beyond these general 
rules and a listing of certain specifics which must be contained in 
registration forms 101 the method to be used in determining valuation 
has been left to local authorities.1°2 The valuation procedure is im-
portant both in terms of profit and reinvestment because the 
amount of net profits which may be remitted abroad is limited to a 
percentage of the registered value of the investment in terms of 
capital gains restrictions. 163 
The effective control of profit remittances depends upon main-
taining an effective system of foreign exchange controls. While a few 
of the AN COM countries did not maintain a foreign exchange regu-
lating system before the Code was adopted, this is being remedied. 104 
While foreign companies may, with the help of the host govern-
98. Article 37 of the Code reads: 
Upon authorization by the competent national authority, f<;>reign investors shall have 
the right to transfer abroad, in fully convertible currency, the verified net profits 
resulting from the foreign direct investment, but not in excess of 14 percent of that 
investment annually. 
In special cases, the Commission may, upon the request of any Member Country, 
authorize higher percentages than that provided in this Article. 
Decision 24, art. 37, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 138 (1972). 
99. Decision 24, art. 1, id. at 128. 
100. Decision 24, art. 21, id. at 134. 
101. Decision 24, annex 1, id. at 144. 
102. Decision 24, arts. 5 & 6, id. at 130. 
103. See text accompanying notes 114-19 infra. 
104. Venezuela, for example, maintained no foreign exchange controls at all before it 
implemented the Code. See INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD, Aug. 
1974, at 12. Chapter VII of Decree 63, however, authorizes the Supertendency of Foreign 
Investments to regulate remittance of profits abroad. In addition, Venezuela's Decree 63 
prescribes penalties for firms which remit profits above their authorized level. For the first 
offense the amount of profits which were illegally remitted must be reimbursed to the Centra.l 
Bank of Venezuela. For a second infraction, the firm's negotiation is cancelled and the foreign 
investor must offer his share of the investment for acquisition by national investors. 
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ment, petition the Andean Commission for special profit treatment 
(and there is indication that requests for special treatment are gen-
erally granted105) the 14 percent profit ceiling has nevertheless been 
the subject of debate within the ANCOM system, and it is possible 
that this ceiling will be adjusted in the not-too-distant future. 106 
Some of the arguments which could be cited against the 14 percent 
profit ceiling are: (1) interest rates for commercial borrowing and 
inflation rates both in the developed and developing countries are 
too high to make a 14 percent rate of remittance on investment 
either attractive or reasonable; (2) once the ANCOM countries have 
fully integrated their system of foreign exchange controls, alterna-
tive means of remitting profits other than as declared earnings will 
be prohibited-and, therefore, levels of declared net profits will in-
crease;107 and (3) since TNE's are prohibited from capitalizing in-
tangibles and paying royalties from subsidiaries to parents some 
additional compensation should be added as an adjustment. 108 
In addition to limiting the amount of net profits which a foreign 
investor may remit abroad, the Andean Code also limits the amount 
of net profits which can be reinvested in an enterprise without prior 
authorization from the competent national authority. In the ab-
sence of authorization, foreign investors are limited to a five percent 
net profit reinvestment annually, calculated as a percentage of the 
registered investment. Up to the five percent limit, reinvestments 
must still be registered with the national authorities. 109 
The question arises as to what may be done with profits above 
the 19 percent level-that is, the 14 percent remittance plus the five 
percent reinvestment limit-in the absence of additional reinvest-
ment authorization. Foreign firms may make new investments in 
the host country, but these new investments must be applied for 
and authorized just as new investments coming from abroad. 11° For-
eign investors may invest in other national or mixed firms, provided 
that such investment can be made without purchasing shares al-
105. Interview with Louis Goodman, Staff Associate of Social Science Research Council, 
in New York City, Apr. 14, 1974. 
106. The profit ceiling question has been on the Commission's agenda and there seems 
little strong objection to having it changed. See Andean Code Changes Proposed, BUSINESS 
LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 25, 1974, at 312. 
107. Reported rates of return on investment from manufacturing companies in Latin 
America have fallen in the 10 to 20 percent range. See La Investment and ROI Prospects Turn 
Favorable for US Firms, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Nov. 20, 1974, at 370-71. 
108. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
109. Decision 24, art. 13, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 132 (1972). 
110. There is no bar in the Code against using excess profits to establish a new enterprise. 
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ready held by national investors, 111 and that the investment does not 
change the mixed or national character of the enterprise.112 Finally, 
Decision 70 of the Andean Commission lists certain types of local 
bond issues which can be purchased with "excess profits" without 
the requirement of authorization.113 
The provisions in the Andean Code regarding the re-
exportation of a foreign investor's capital abroad are perhaps the 
most ambiguous provisions in the Code, 114 and therefore leave a good 
measure of discretion in the hands of the individual member govern-
ment. It appears that foreign investors are limited in their re-
exportation of capital to the amount of the investment authorized 
and registered with local authorities. 115 In addition, the foreign di-
rect investor must agree with the local authorities, at the time the 
investment is registered, on the method which is to be used to value 
his shares at the time of sale for divestment purposes.116 The valua-
tion procedure which is used by the local authorities becomes, as it 
does with the profit remittance regulations~ 117 of primary import-
ance to the foreign investor. By inflating or deflating the value of 
the initially registered investment, the local authorities can either 
111. Decision 24, art. 3, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'I..S 126, 129 (1972). 
112. Decision 24, art. 4, id. at 130. 
113. By Resolution 6074, September 1974, Venezuela defines these securities to include, 
inter alia, public debt instruments, mortgage bonds issued by Venezuelan mortgage banks, 
commercial bonds which grant no right of participation in the management of the company, 
and obligations issued by the Andean Development Corp. State Department memorandum, 
supra note 56, at 5. 
In addition, some foreign investors have reported that they are allowed to use their excess 
profits for local expenses not directly related to their businesses, for example intra-company 
airfare costs. 
114. The provisions of the Code which deal directly with the question of capital re-
exportation are Articles 7-10 inclusive. Decision 24, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'I..S 126, 131 (1972). 
115. This interpretation follows from Article 8, which provides that: 
[R]e-exportable capital is understood to be the capital formed by the total of the 
original foreign direct investment which is registered and actually made, plus the 
reinvestments made in the same enterprise in accordance with the provisions of this 
regime and minus net losses, if any. 
In cases of participation of national investors the foregoing provisions should be 
understood to be limited to the percentage of the direct foreign investment in connec-
tion with the reinvestments made and with the net losses. 
Decision 24, art. 8, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'I..S 126, 131 (1972). 
This amount would include additional new foreign investments made in the enterprise 
which are authorized and registered. 
116. Decision 24, art. 31. Id. at 137. The need for this valuation procedure reflects the 
fact that there are no operational "stock markets" in any of the AN COM countries and that, 
when the time for divestment approaches, local private capital may be scarce. Therefore, 
share values will have to be administratively determined. 
117. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. 
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increase or decrease the permissible level of profit remittances and 
the maximum amount which the investor can receive at the time of 
the sale of his share in the enterprise. Thus the valuation procedure 
provides both government and investor with a bargaining flexibility 
which is lacking in other areas of the Code. 
Whether the foreign direct investor is limited in capital re-
exportation to the amount of the registered investment is not abso-
lutely clear. Neither the Andean Commission nor local implement-
ing legislation has done much to settle the ambiguity surrounding 
these provisions. The Code could just as easily be interpreted to 
indicate that investors may re-export whatever amount of capital is 
received at the time his shares are sold. 118 
In either case, the investor does not face a capital loss at the 
time of sale, since for tax purposes he will have depreciated the 
value of his assets on his own records. The foreign investor is, how-
ever, required to pay whatever taxes the host country may impose 
on the sale of his assets to local investors before re-exportation. 119 A 
great deal depends upon the discretion of the local authorities and 
upon the foreign investor's ability to bargain with them effectively. 
The Andean Code regulations govern credit transactions. All 
contracts for external credit must be authorized and registered by 
competent local authorities. 120 Payments made to amortize loans 
from abroad must be authorized by local officials in accordance with 
registered contracts. 121 In addition, the Code limits the amount of 
interest which may be paid on an intra-company loan between a 
foreign parent or affiliate and an ANCOM subsidiary to not more 
than three percent above the going rate of interest on first class 
loans in the country from which the loan is made. 122 Finally, foreign 
enterprises are denied access to other than short-term local credit 
118. This interpretation of the Code proceeds from both the Code and the national 
implementing legislation. Article 10 reads: "Foreign investors shall have the right to transfer 
abroad the amounts obtained from the sale of their shares, participation, or rights, after 
payment of the pertinent taxes." Decision 24, art. 10, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 131 (1972). 
Venezuela's implementing legislation is typified by Decree 63, Article 33, which reads: "For-
eign investors shall be entitled to remit abroad the amount resulting from the sale of their 
shares, participations, rights to national investors or from the liquidation of the company." 
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1221, 1226 (1974). 
119. Decision 24, art. 10, 11 INT' L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 131 (1972). This provision on the 
application of domestic taxes to re-exported capital may lead to the conclusion that the 
investor is better off in obtaining substantial local equity participation at the outset of the 
investment. 
120. Decision 24, art. 14, id. at 132. 
121. Decision 24, art. 16, id. 
122. Decision 24, art. 16, id. 
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in accordance with rules to be established by the Andean Commis-
sion.123 
In order to effectively control the flow of foreign exchange out 
of the ANCOM countries, the Andean Code authorizes the member 
countries to establish an "information and price control system of 
intermediate products that may be furnished by suppliers of foreign 
capital and technology." 124 The system grew out of a study which 
showed that profits were regularly taken out ofColombia by TNE's 
as inflated payments made by subsidiaries to parents for intermedi-
ate products and not as declared earnings.125 
The establishment of effective transfer-pricing controls requires 
the creation of a highly efficient bureaucracy. Data on the arms-
length prices of an enormous amount of intermediate goods must be 
accumulated and stored for retrieval, while prices undergo continu-
ous change. The practicality of such a system was questioned by 
Senator Javits in the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons. 126 
Reports from the ANCOM countries have yet to indicate that sub-
stantial progress is being made in the development of such a system. 
The Andean Code prohibits the inclusion, in agreements con-
cerning foreign investments or the transfer of technology, of clauses 
which remove jurisdiction over investment disputes from the host 
country. The Code also prohibits the subrogation of foreign states 
to the rights of its national investors in the event of investment 
disputes. 127 The provision on subrogation is principally directed to-
wards government operated investment insurance companies-such 
as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation128-which suc-
ceed to the rights of their national investors after the payment of a 
claim (for example, for expropriation compensation) in order to per-
mit the use of diplomatic intervention to obtain compensation from 
host country governments. 129 The provision by the ANCOM govern-
123. Decision 24, art. 17, id. 
124. Decision 24, art. 6(c), id. at 131. 
125. See generally Vaitsos, Transfer of Resources and Preservation of Monopoly Rents, 
in HARVARD UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
No. 168 (1970). See also, on the role of transfer pricing in the remittance of profits, Impact 
Report, supra note 36, at 74-75. 
126. See Impact Report, supra note 36, at 99. 
127. Decision 24, art. 51, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 141 (1972). 
128. Several developed country governments now operate programs of foreign invest-
ment guarantees for their national investors. 
129. OPIC's legislative purpose is to stimulate the flow of U .S. private capital into less 
developed countries by guaranteeing these investments against political risks and providing 
developmental loans. See, e.g., Public L . No. 93-390 (Aug. 27, 1974) . Since OPIC operates 
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ments that investment disputes may only be decided in the host 
country does not mean that a foreign investor could not appeal a 
denial of justice to an international tribunal and seek whatever 
remedies are available under international law. 
D. Provisions Regulating the Transfer of Technology 
The AN COM countries attach great value to the role of modern 
technology in the industrial development process. 130 The goal of 
ANCOM technology policy is to acquire necessary technology from 
abroad at the least possible cost and with the fewest strings at-
tached,131 and simultaneously to improve local research and devel-
opment capabilities. 132 
The ANCOM countries have developed a new attitude towards 
the transfer of technology from abroad, whose impact is only begin-
ning to be felt by foreign direct investors. 133 In essence, the attitude 
derives from the belief that technology should not be 
commercialized, but that developed country industries should make 
it freely or cheaply available to developing countries.134 Research 
on a self-sustaining basis, however, it must require compensation from host country govern-
ments or rapidly deplete its insurance reserves. OPIC seeks compensation only as required 
by general principles of international law and not through U.S. Government diplomatic 
intimidation. 
130. The introductory portion of Decision 84 of the Andean Commission reads in part: 
"Our contemporary world is characterized by the controlling influence that is inherent in the 
possession of know-how and the capacity to utilize it in economic and social orientation." See 
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1478 (1974). 
131. The ANCOM countries relate their previous relation to technology transfer as fol-
lows: 
Member Nations have had recourse to external services in a proponderant form to 
satisfy the needs of technical development, with such undesirable results as the 
following solutions inadequate to the characteristics of economic development of the 
Member Nations and to the availability of productive factors; extremely elevated 
costs; limited possibility to exercise a choice among various alternative solutions; the 
displacement of local operations and elements, and the underutilization of local 
scientific and technological resources; a conditioning of political and economic deci-
sions to technological solution imposed from abroad; and a miscellany of unsatisfied 
needs due to the inadequacy of technological solutions . 
Decision 84, id. at 1478. 
132. Decision 84, para. 5, id. at 1481. 
133. This impact comes as the AN COM countries gradually require investors to conform 
their technology agreements to the Andean Code's regulations. Venezuela has, for example, 
given foreign investors until December 31, 1975, to have their contracts approved by the 
Superintendency of Foreign Investments; after which, contracts which do not conform will 
cease to have legal effect. Decree 63, arts. 61 & 63, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1221, 1232 (1974). 
134. See generally Junta del Acuerdo de Cartegena, Policies Relating to Technology of 
the countries of the Andean Pact: Their Foundations, U.N. Doc. TD/107 (1971). 
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and development costs involved in the generation of new commer-
cial technology are fixed costs of the enterprise involved. This fixed 
cost is recovered by the enterprise when its product is mar-
keted-that is, the product incorporates the technology, and the 
technology costs are reflected in the selling price of the product. For 
a parent company to sell this technology to its own subsidiary is to 
profit twice from the technology: once from the sale of the product 
itself, and once from the sale of the technology .135 
The ANCOM countries have created legal mechanisms for im-
plementing their policy relating to technology transfer in the An-
dean Code and in the recently enacted Decisions 84 and 85 of the 
Andean Commission. 136 The Andean Code provides broad rules on 
several aspects of the technology transfer (or "commercialization") 
process, and Decisions 84 and 85 supplement the Code with detailed 
provisions relating both to the creation of a regional technological 
infrastructure and to the legal treatment of patents, licenses, and 
trademarks within ANCOM. 
The Andean Code provides that technological agreements may 
not be capitalized as foreign direct investments. 137 In addition, par-
ent companies or their affiliates are prohibited from receiving roy-
alty payments from their subsidiaries incorporated in ANCOM 
countries for the use of patents, trademarks, licenses, and in some 
cases, even technical assistance in the form of personnel. 1311 All 
135. Id. 
136. Decision 84 of the Andean Commission, Decision on The Bases for a Subregional 
Technological Policy, and Decision 85, Decision on Industrial Property, were adopted in June 
1974. For the text of these two decisions see 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1478-99 (1974). The 
AN COM governments were given a period of six months following the approval of the Deci-
sions to incorporate them into domestic law. Implementing legislation is not yet available, 
and it is not yet reported that the Decisions have been implemented. It is possible, of course, 
that these new Decisions may be modified somewhat in their implementation in the individ-
ual member countries. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion we will treat these 
Decisions as if adopted in total. 
137. Decision 24, arts. 1 & 21, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 128, 134 (1972). This, of course, 
means that technology capital cannot be used to increase the right to profit remittances, or 
be included in valuation calculation for the purposes. of re-export of capital. See Section III.D. 
of the text. 
138. Decision 24, art. 21, id. at 134. While the Code prohibits royalty payments for 
"intangible technological contribution," this term is not expressly defined in the main body 
of the Code. Intangible technological contributions are referred to in Annex 1 of the Code as: 
"Marks, Industrial Models, Managerial Capacity, Technical Knowhow Whether or Not Pat-
ented, and Alternate Possible Technologies." In Venezuela's implementing Decree 63, tech-
nological contributions are expressly defined for Article 21 purposes to include technical 
assistance in the form of qualified personnel. Decree 63, art. 6, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1221, 
1222 (1974). 
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technological agreements, whether between parent and subsidiary, 
or between an ANCOM incorporated firm and unrelated foreign 
firm, must be approved by the competent authority of the receiving 
member country .139 
Patent and trademark licensing agreements are prohibited 
from incorporating a variety of restrictive clauses which might tend 
to limit the flexibility of the receiving AN COM company in the use 
of the license (for example, export restricting clauses, tie-in clauses, 
and the like). 140 The recent Decisions 84 and 85 of the Andean Com-
mission, however, establish in detail the guidelines for the registra-
tion and authorization of patents, trademarks, and licenses within 
ANCOM, and the uniform legal treatment which such registration 
will confer. 141 
Decision 85 provides regulations for the registration of patents 
in the receiving ANCOM country and delineates the legal rights 
which ownership of a patent may confer. Patents may not be 
granted for certain types of products. 142 The application for a patent 
must include a technical description of the invention complete 
enough to allow duplication. 143 Patents may be granted for a maxi-
mum period of ten years, with renewal and proof of exploitation 
required after five years. 144 Subject to the limitations expressed in 
other areas of Decision 85, a patent confers on the owner the exclu-
sive right to exploit it in the recipient country, to grant licenses for 
its exploitation, and to receive royalties or compensation for its 
exploitation. Patents do not confer an exclusive right to import the 
patented product or one manufactured under the patented pro-
cess.145 Filing a patent application in one ANCOM country gives the 
applicant a (one-year) priority right to file for patent in the other 
member countries. 146 
The more interesting regulations of Decision 85 have to do with 
the licensing of patents. Patents may only be exploited in ANCOM 
139. Decision 24, art. 18, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 132 (1972). 
140. Article 20 for clauses which may not be contained in contract on the transfer of 
techniques or patents and Article 25 for clauses which may not be contained in trademark 
licensing agreements. Decision 24, arts. 20 & 25, id. at 133, 135. 
141. Decision 84 deals primarily with the establishment of a regional technology policy. 
Legal details are contained in Decision 85. See note 136 supra. 
142. This includes, inter alia, pharmaceutical products and beverages. Decision 85, art. 
5, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1489, 1490 (1974). 
143. Decision 85, art. 12(e), id. at 1491. 
144. Decision 85, art. 29, id. at 1492. 
145. Decision 85, art. 28, id. 
146. Decision 85, art. 10, id. at 1491. 
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pursuant to authorization by competent national authorities. 147 Li-
censed patents must be exploited within the country of registration 
according to conditions established in Decision 85. 1411 After a period 
of three years from the date that the patent is granted, any person 
may apply to the competent authority for the granting of a "com-
pulsory license" if the patent has not been exploited adequately 
within the member country. After a period of five years the compe-
tent authority may grant a compulsory license regardless of whether 
or not conditions of exploitation have been satisfied. 149 The holder 
of a compulsory license must pay an "adequate compensation" to a 
patent holder. 150 The government of the country in which the patent 
is registered may at any time grant a compulsory license in view of 
national development needs or interest in the public · health. m Li-
censes which do not comply with the regulations established in De-
cision 85 will be considered void. 152 
Trademarks must be approved and registered by the competent 
national authority as well, 153 and registration of a trademark grants 
the right of exclusive use for continuously renewable periods of five 
years. 154 Likewise, trademark licensing agreements must be ap-
proved and registered. 155 Trademark licensing agreements may not 
include a variety of export-restrictive clauses, which were earlier 
prohibited by Article 25 of the Andean Code. 156 Trademarks are not 
subject to "compulsory licensing" as are patents. 
The new ANCOM regulations governing patents, licensing, and 
trademarks represent an attempt by the member countries to make 
modern technology more freely accessible to commercial enterprises 
in the region. The regulations provided by Decision 85 represent a 
radical departure from the traditional concept that patent owner-
ship rights should be afforded the highest degree of protection. In 
effect, the patent licensing rules provided by Decision 85 mean that 
147. Decision 85, arts. 32, 42, & 43, id. at 1493, 1494. 
148. The exploitation of a patent may not be suspended for more than one year; produc-
tion of the patented product must meet the demands of the national market re quality, 
quantity, and price; and the patent owner must grant licenses under reasonable conditions 
to satisfy the market. Decision 85, art. 34, id. at 1493. 
149. Decision 85, art. 34, id . 
150. Decision 85, art. 34, id. 
151. Decision 85, art. 39, id. at 1494. 
152. Decision 85, art. 40, id. 
153. Decision 85, art. 60, id. at 1497. 
154. Decision 85, art. 69, id. 
155. Decision 85, art. 81, id. at 1498. 
156. Decision 85, art. 81, id. 
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ANCOM country governments are free to give away a registered 
patent to any enterprise which desires it, so long as this procedure 
is considered in the interests of the member countries' development 
plans, and so long as some unspecified form of compensation is 
provided to the patent owner. The rules do not specify that "com-
pulsory licenses" may be issued solely to ANCOM national inves-
tors, and it appears that a foreign investor's registered patents may 
even be licensed to other foreign enterprises in ANCOM. 
Decision 85 was designed to be implemented in the domestic 
law of the ANCOM members within six months following its ap-
proval by the Commission. 157 No information has yet been made 
available on the process of implementation and, as was the case 
with the Andean Code, the time limit on implementation may be 
exceeded by the member countries. However, when the Decision is 
implemented its rules will apply to patents, licenses, and trade-
marks already registered in the region. 158 In addition, the rule estab-
lished in Article 21 of the Andean Code which provides that subsidi-
aries may not pay royalties to their parent companies is already 
being enforced in at least some of the member countries; 159 and while 
technology supply costs may to some extent be added to the selling 
price of products and thereby returned as profit, these profits are 
limited to 14 percent per annum on the registered value of the 
investment (which cannot include technology). 
The impact of the new technology transfer regulations on for-
eign direct investor behavior can only be speculated upon, as they 
have no precedent in modern investment regulation. It might be 
expected that for foreign firms whose research and development 
costs are high (for whom innovative technology represents a primary 
competitive advantage over their international rivals), the ANCOM 
technology regulations will represent a major disincentive to new 
investment. Or, at least, these firms may wait a period of several 
years after the development of a new technology before bringing it 
into the Andean region. For firms whose products embody technol-
ogy which is widely dispersed and whose investment advantages lay 
more in the access to capital, marketing, or managerial skills, the 
157. Decision 85, art. 86, id. at 1499. 
158. Decision 85, art . 85, id. 
159. Venezuela, for example, has indicated to foreign direct investors that as of Decem-
ber 31, 1975, their technology agreements must conform to Decree 63 regulations, one of 
which, Article 21, prohibits the payment of subsidiary to parent royalties . Foreign firms have 
been informed that after December 31, 1975, they will no longer be permitted royalties to their 
parents. 
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technology regulations should have little impact at all. 
The ANCOM countries are betting that foreign investors will 
be willing to trade their technology for access to the expanded 
ANCOM market. The outcome of this gamble remains to be seen. 
If successful, the ANCOM policy may improve their technological 
infrastructure and increase their industrial self-sufficiency. If un-
successful, the result may be another period of years in which 
AN COM industries fall farther behind those of the developed coun-
tries in technological development. It remains to be seen how far the 
ANCOM countries can proceed in extracting concessions from for-
eign direct investors before disincentives overshadow opportunities. 
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF MARKETS AS APPLIED TO 
THE ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE 
A. Changing the Economic Balance of Power 
In the second section of this Article the relationship between 
host developing countries and foreign direct investors was analyzed 
in terms of bargaining theory. It was noted that as the economic 
power relationship between the two major bargaining participants 
changes, the terms by which foreign direct investors are permitted 
to operate are also subject to change. The member countries of the 
Andean Common Market have taken affirmative action to increase 
their economic bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign direct investors. 
The movement towards creating a free trade zone among the mem-
bers and establishing a common customs barrier have, in effect, 
created one large economic unit where before there existed an unre-
lated collection of smaller units. The creation of this integrated 
market and the concentration of sovereign authorities in the Andean 
Commission have enhanced the economic bargaining power of the 
ANCOM countries and have resulted in a change in the terms under 
which foreign direct investors are permitted to operate. 
As of 1973 the combined population of the ANCOM countries 
was 71.6 million persons. By 1980 this figure is expected to reach 
more than 90 million. 160 Thus, measured in terms of population, the 
ANCOM market is now larger than that of either Argentina or Mex-
ico, and is second only to Brazil among the Latin American coun-
tries.161 In addition to a large consumer market, the ANCOM coun-
160. See How Latin America 's Markets Measure Up , BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA , Dec. 25, 
1974, at 411. 
161. Id. 
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tries collectively offer to foreign direct investors a wide range of 
natural resources vital to manufacturing activities, for example, 
Venezuelan iron and petroleum, Bali vian tin, and Chilean copper, 
and a large manpower pool, not as yet fully tapped. 
Of course, for a common market to be an attractive market 
there must be some indication that the reduction of tariff barriers 
will result in an increase in intra-regional trade. Recently released 
IMF Direction of Trade statistics162 provide empirical evidence that 
tariff reductions in the ANCOM region are producing an increase 









Intra-ANCOM Exports (f.o.b.) 
and Imports (c.i.f.) 




Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
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3.7 4.6 24.2 8.0 554 74 
15.0 49.3 23.4 59.4 56 20 
24.0 22.0 79.1 41.7 230 90 
12.3 17.3 75.4 32.4 513 87 
23.1 28.2 45.2 90.7 96 222 
64.6 19.7 51.4 23.1 -20 17 
142.7 141.1 298.7 255.3 108 81 



















If Venezuela is excluded from the figures above, because the tre-
mendous rise in petroleum prices actually decreased its share of 
intra-ANCOM exports, the figures for the remaining five ANCOM 
countries show an increase in intra-regional trading of 217 percent 
between 1968 (the year before ANCOM was formed), and 1973. 
While the base from which these countries began is not great, 163 the 
increase may well be indicative of a trend towards the satisfaction 
of ANCOM demands with locally produced product.s. 
As a general proposition the ANCOM countries, like all of the 
Latin American countries, are at an intermediate stage of industrial 
development. 164 At this stage, in order to maintain a competitive 
import-substituting and export-producing manufacturing sector, 
162. IMF, Direction of Trade, Statistics Bureau, reprinted in Andean Trade Expansion 
is Spurred on by Integration Efforts, BusINESS LATIN AMERICA, May 21, 1975, at 163. 
163. That is, intra-ANCOM trade as a percentage of exports rose from a 1968 base of 
2.5 percent, to a 6.0 percent total in 1973. 
164. See U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Report of May 1975, at 1; A. 
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 96, at 8. 
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the ANCOM countries must to some extent depend on foreign capi-
tal and technological expertise. At present, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Chile are more dependent on foreign assistance than are Colombia, 
Peru, and Venezuela. The collective attitude of the ANCOM coun-
tries towards the contribution of foreign direct investment in the 
development process can be more readily identified-although cer-
tainly the range of positions between Chile and Peru may be consid-
erably different. This attitude is that foreign direct investment has 
both positive and negative attributes, and while the positive con-
tributing factors may be encouraged, the negative attributes-such 
as a tendency towards political intervention-cannot be allowed to 
predominate. Individual investment projects must be examined 
carefully to determine the contribution which may be afforded to 
the development process and must be accepted only on the basis of 
positive contribution. 
The AN COM countries retain the bargaining advantage of sov-
ereign authority, and with this authority at least partially concen-
trated by the Andean Commission, their power has been enhanced. 
That is, foreign governments and investors are no longer confronted 
by a single and relatively small Latin American country when they 
attempt to influence or object to a decision which an ANCOM gov-
ernment has made. Parties attempting to bargain with the ANCOM 
countries are now confronted with a sovereign unit whose territorial 
mass extends the entire western length of Latin America. While this 
enhancement of sovereign power cannot be measured in statistical 
terms, the U.S. Government, for 'example, would more likely sooner 
take an action which might alienate a single state like Bolivia than 
one which might alienate the entire Andean group. 
The economic bargaining power of foreign direct investors is 
limited by the lack of concentrated authority. While the AN COM 
governments may present a united front to foreign investors, these 
investors remain in competition with each other in the international 
arena and, in the case of U.S. investors at least, may be prohibited 
by antitrust laws from agreeing with unanimity to a set of minimum 
investment terms from the ANCOM countries. And even if U.S. 
investors could agree to form a united bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the ANCOM countries, their competitors from Japan and Western 
Europe would remain independently able to fill an investment vac-
uum. A policy of confrontation might be successful if cooperation 
could be established among the direct investment suppliers of all 
the developed countries. This policy, however, would be both im-
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practical and counterproductive. 165 
In addition, the greater the incentives for investment offered by 
a particular region, the more likely that foreign direct investors 
would be willing to accept less attractive investment terms. Thus, 
whichever factors explain the motivation behind a foreign investor's 
decision to enter a particular region, 166 the increase in AN COM 
market size and the trend towards increased intra-regional trade are 
bound to represent positive investment incentives. The increased 
economies of scale which foreign direct investors are permitted and 
the protection which a common tariff barrier may afford will in-
crease the competitive advantage of the local producer. Transna-
tional competitors are not likely to risk losing a market as large as 
ANCOM to their rivals. 
B. The ANCOM Bargaining Strategy 
Within the limits of the economic balance of power, host coun-
tries and foreign direct investors may employ bargaining strategy to 
obtain for themselves the most attractive set of investment condi-
tions that are mutually acceptable. The bargaining strategy of the 
ANCOM countries has taken the form of the Andean Foreign In-
vestment Code. The Andean Code establishes for all of the member 
countries a set of minimum non-negotiable bargaining principles 
which the members are prohibited from relaxing. The commitments 
of the member countries are enforced by public opinion, domestic 
law, and the sanctioning powers of their ANCOM neighbors. 167 
The major commitments of the ANCOM countries include the 
gradual divestment of majority ownership and control in non-
exempted sectors, the adherence to strict requirements for agree-
ments on the transfer of technology, and, to a great degree, the 
limitation of the remittance of profits abroad. 168 Because these 
major principles are non-negotiable, they place the foreign direct 
investor in a position of either investing and accepting the terms 
offered, or rejecting these terms and refraining from entering 
AN COM. 
165. That is, a united demand by the Western developed investment suppliers for a 
change in the terms of the Andean Code would probably cause political problems which would 
more than outweigh the benefits of improved investment terms. 
166. See Section 11.A.2 of the text. 
167. The most powerful evidence that this sanctioning power is effective is that Chile 
was forced to back down from a different set of principles which it established in contraven-
tion of the Code. See note 90 supra. 
168. Exemption from this requirement requires petitioning the Andean Commission. See 
text accompanying note 105 supra. 
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On the other hand, the Andean Code by no means eliminates 
all bargaining between individual ANCOM governments and poten-
tial foreign direct investors. The valuation of the foreign direct in-
vestment (on which much of the potential for an investment's prof-
itability depends) has been left to the discretion of the individual 
member governments. In addition, the levels of income taxation and 
capital re-export taxation, as well as the ability to petition the Com-
mission for a change in profit remittance levels, have been left in 
the hands of individual member governments. Therefore, for foreign 
direct investors who are willing to accept the major requirements of 
the Andean Code, there remains a flexibility within which a rela-
tively attractive investment agreement can be negotiated. 
The increase in ANCOM's economic power vis-a-vis foreign 
direct investors and the strategy of commitment to several major 
investment regulating principles are designed to produce a major 
change in the role which foreign direct investors play in the political, 
social, and economic life of the ANCOM countries. For the desired 
changes to be achieved, the ANCOM countries must maintain a 
firm commitment to these principles, because once negotiation over 
the major principles of the Andean Code is permitted, the ability 
of the member countries to maintain them will be severely dimin-
ished. 
C. The Outcome of the ANCOM Strategy 
We cannot judge the impact of the Code on the basis of whether 
the flow of foreign direct investment into ANCOM has increased, 
diminished, or remained the same because the ANCOM countries 
clearly had goals in mind other than maintaining a steady flow of 
foreign direct investment when adopting the Code. How can we 
measure the political, economic, and social value of increased par-
ticipation of local investors in the industrial development plans and 
future of a region? 
The U.S. Department of Commerce statistics on the book value 
of U.S. direct manufacturing investments in ANCOM and other 
Latin American countries supply little in the way of revealing analy-
sis. '69 
169. These statistics are compiled from the Department of Commerce publication 
Survey of Current Business, for the years 1968-1974. 
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of U.S . Companies - Manufacturing Totals (Millions of $U.S.) 
Total 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1966 1975 
--- ·-~- -
Chile 8 11 13 18 10 3 1 1 3 9) 
) 
Colombia 20 24 22 25 34 39 49 51 49 58) ANCOM total 
) excluding 
Peru 28 42 31 15 7 8 6 6 6 11) Ecuador & 
) Bolivia 
Venezuela 37 44 45 62 55 59 56 85 79 107) 93 185 
Other and 
Unallocated 7 6 7 13 6 6 7 10 24 23 - -
Mexico 100 105 177 155 168 142 157 180 213 254 100 254 
Panama 1 2 2 4 3 4 6 8 10 10 1 10 
Other Central 
America 13 15 19 23 26 26 23 28 35 44 - -
Argentina 60 73 64 95 124 90 59 89 95 106 60 106 
Brazil 91 142 200 206 189.. 295 461 563 645 1040 I 91 1040 
In the five year period between 1968 (two years before the An-
dean Code was adopted) and 1973, the increase in the book value 
of U.S. manufacturing investments in the ANCOM countries as a 
whole (excluding Bolivia and Ecuador) was considerably greater 
than that for Argentina, slightly less than the increase for Mexico, 
and considerably less than the increase for Brazil. Chile, where the 
value of U.S. manufacturing investment actually decreased during 
this five year period, experienced severe political disruptions during 
this period, so that the decline in foreign direct investment activity 
can hardly be attributed solely to the Andean Code. Peru, where the 
value of U.S. manufacturing investment remained nearly constant, 
pursued a policy towards foreign direct investors which went beyond 
the requirements of the Andean Code. 
The Department of Commerce estimates on property, plant, 
and equipment expenditures by U.S. manufacturers, which are 
more current, tell much the same story .170 Again we find that 
ANCOM as a whole was the site of expenditure increases slightly 
higher than in Argentina, slightly lower than in Mexico, and with 
other Latin American countries lagging far behind Brazil. Again, 
the lack of dynamism in Chile and Peru must be attributed to 
domestic political activities as much as to the Andean Code. 
What conclusions can we draw from these statistics? First, it 
appears that Brazil is far more attractive to foreign direct investors 
170. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT 
BUSINESS, Sept. 1974, at 23-34, Mar. 1975, at 19-23. 
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1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1966 1975 
Chile -8- 11 ~----rs-~~- 1 1 3 9) -ANCOM-
Colombia 20 24 22 25 34 39 49 51 49 58) totals 
Peru 28 42 31 15 7 8 6 6 6 11) excluding 
Ecuador & 
Bolivia 
Venezuela 37 44 45 62 55 59 56 85 79 107) 93 185 
Other and 
Unallocated 7 6 7 13 6 6 7 10 24 23 - -
Mexico 100 105 177 155 168 142 157 180 213 254 100 254 
Panama 1 2 2 4 3 4 6 8 10 10 1 10 
Other Central 
American 13 15 19 23 26 26 23 28 35 44 - -
Argentina 60 73 64 95 124 90 59 89 95 106 60 106 
Brazil 91 142 200 206 189 295 461 463 645 1040 91 1040 
than other Latin American countries. Brazil offers the largest con-
sumer market in Latin America in terms of population, an unusual 
history of political stability, and a governmental attitude which is 
hospitable to foreign direct investment. 171 Beyond this, the ANCOM 
countries as a unit have attracted slightly more foreign direct in-
vestment than Argentina and slightly less than Mexico in the period 
since the Andean Code was adopted. Argentina and Mexico have 
adopted foreign investment regulations somewhat similar to those 
of the ANCOM countries. 172 
But as has already been indicated, the measure of success or 
failure of the AN COM policy towards foreign direct investment will 
depend on the future of economic development in ANCOM, the 
increase in political, economic, and social autonomy, and the crea-
tion of a technological infrastructure which is capable of meeting 
the challenges of the developed world. It may well be 20 years before 
the results are clear. 
D. Implications and Conclusion 
A great tension presently surrounds the relationship between 
developing countries and foreign direct investors throughout the 
world. Governments feel themselves threatened by what they per-
ceive as the overwhelming power of transnational enterprises to in-
fluence their economies and destinies. Transnational enterprises 
consider themselves threatened by what they consider a disregard 
on the part of sovereign governments for their legal rights. 
171. For a thorough discussion of investment conditions in Brazil, see generally P. GAR-
LAND, 0otNG BUSINESS IN AND WITH BRAZIL (1972) . 
172. For Argentina, see 12 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1489 (1973). For Mexico, see id. at 643. 
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The member countries of the Andean Common Market have 
taken innovative steps towards achieving a balance between their 
own interests and the interests of foreign direct investors. They have 
integrated their economies, and to some extent their sovereign au-
thorities, in order to increase their economic power vis-a-vis foreign 
direct investors, and they have adopted and implemented the An-
dean Foreign Investment Code to take advantage of the new eco-
nomic balance. 
The continuous bargaining process which characterizes the re-
lationship between host countries and foreign direct investors indi-
cates that investment agreements are subject to renegotiation and 
change. The Andean Foreign Investment Code provides a legal 
mechanism to accomplish this change over time by requiring foreign 
investors gradually to relinquish their control over manufacturing 
enterprises. The Code thus provides a mechanism for reducing 
the political tensions surrounding the presence of transnational sub-
sidiaries by eliminating the necessity for abrupt demands or expro-
priations by the ANCOM countries. It also embodies a degree of 
flexibility which permits both governments and investors to seek 
and make concessions on the terms of investment agreements. 
The ANCOM model of integration and investment regulation 
may well be the wave of the future. Unless the international com-
munity as a whole can prescribe guidelines for the operations of 
transnational enterprises, it remains for individual countries and 
regions to deal with the issues surrounding them on their own. In 
this Article an attempt has been made to characterize the relation-
ship between host countries and foreign direct investors and to show 
how the actions of governments can affect this relationship. Legal 
systems cannot be divorced from the realities which they govern, 
and if systems are to be developed which can reduce the tensions 
surrounding foreign direct investment, the factors which govern in-
vestment conditions must first be understood. 
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